VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE by Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M.
  
 
 
 
 
VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTS AND MARKET STRUCTURE 
 
Roman Inderst 
Holger M. Mueller 
 
 
S-CG-02-02 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper Series     CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Research Group 
Venture Capital Contracts and Market Structure∗
Roman Inderst† Holger M. Müller‡
First Draft: February 2000. This Draft: January 2002
∗We are indebted to Per Strömberg for valuable comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Patrick
Bolton, Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb, Thomas Hellmann, Martin Hellwig, Josh Lerner, Kjell Nyborg,
Enrico Perotti, Elu von Thadden, Masako Ueda, Andy Winton, Julie Wulf, and seminar participants
at Amsterdam, Humboldt, Mannheim, Stockholm School of Economics, Tilburg, the Columbia-NYU-
Princeton-Wharton-Yale Five Star Conference on Research in Finance at NYU (2001), the workshop
“Strategic Interactions in Relationship Finance: Bank Lending and Venture Capital” at LSE (2001), the
workshop “Finance for the XXI Century” in Amsterdam (2001), and the European Summer Symposium
in Financial Markets (ESSFM) in Gerzensee (2001) for helpful comments. Earlier versions of this paper
circulated under the titles “Competition and Efficiency in the Market for Venture Capital” and “Market
Structure, Contracting, and Value Creation in Venture Capital Finance.”
†London School of Economics, FMG, & CEPR. Address: Department of Economics & Department
of Accounting and Finance, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE. Email:
r.inderst@lse.ac.uk.
‡New York University & CEPR. Address: Department of Finance, Stern School of Business, New York
University, 44 West Fourth Street, Suite 9-190, New York, NY 10012-1126. Email: hmueller@stern.nyu.edu
1
Abstract
We examine the relation between optimal venture capital contracts and the supply and
demand for venture capital. Both the composition and type of financial claims held by the
venture capitalist and entrepreneur depend on the market structure. Moreover, different
market structures involve different optimal forms of transferring utility: sometimes it is
optimal to transfer utility via equity stakes, sometimes it is optimal to use debt. Trans-
ferring utility via equity stakes affects incentives. Consequently, the net value created, the
success probability, the market (or IPO) value, and the performance of venture-capital
backed investments all depend on the supply and demand for capital. Similarly, venture
capitalists face different incentives to screen projects ex ante if the capital supply is low
or high. We then endogenize the capital supply and study the relation between ven-
ture capital contracts and entry costs, public policy, investment profitability, and market
transparency. Finally, we show that entry by inexperienced investors creates a negative
externality for the value creation in ventures financed by (regular) venture capitalists.
2
1 Introduction
This paper examines the relation between optimal venture capital contracts and the supply
and demand for venture capital. Addressing this question within the traditional financial
contracting framework is problematic as it assumes that one side (typically the entrepre-
neur) has all the market power. We therefore depart from the traditional paradigm and
embed venture capital contracting in a search market where entrepreneurs and venture
capitalists bargain over optimal contracts. Both the supply and demand for capital are
competitive in the sense that there are many venture capitalists and many entrepreneurs.
The market power of each side is determined by the ratio of supply to demand. A high
ratio implies a high degree of competition among venture capitalists.
Both the composition and type of financial claims held by the venture capitalist and
entrepreneur depends on the market structure. If the degree of competition is either low
or high, one side holds a mix of debt and equity and the other side holds straight equity.
If the degree of competition is intermediate, both sides hold debt and equity. Generally, a
change in supply and demand affects market powers and hence the distribution of surplus.
The question is whether utility should be transferred via equity or debt. As a guiding
principle, utility should be transferred in a way that minimizes incentive distortions. We
show that different market structures entail different optimal forms of transferring utility.
If the degree of competition is either low or high, utility is transferred by changing the
equity component of the optimal contract. If the degree of competition is intermediate,
utility is transferred by changing the debt component.
As work by Lerner (1995), Hellmann and Puri (2001), and Kaplan and Strömberg
(2001b) indicates, venture capital contracting may be appropriately viewed as a double-
sided moral-hazard problem.1 Venture capitalists monitor the progress of the firm, give
advice, provide entrepreneurs with access to consultants, investment bankers, and lawyers,
negotiate with suppliers, and play an active role in the building up of human resources
and recruiting of senior management. Under double-sided moral hazard, the second-best
solution requires that both the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur hold sufficiently
large equity stakes. Actual equity stakes, however, are determined by bargaining, where
outside options depend on the level of competition in the capital market. For low and high
levels of competition, outside options are strongly asymmetric, which implies that equity
stakes , and hence incentives, deviate from the second-best optimum. (While riskless debt
can be used to transfer utility without affecting incentives, the total amount of riskless
debt available is limited.)
1Theoretical papers taking this route include Casamatta (2000), Renucci (2000), Repullo and Suarez
(2000), and Schmidt (2000).
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This has the following implications: the net value created in ventures is a hump-shaped
function of the degree of competition. If efforts are substitutes, the success probability, the
market (or IPO) value, and the average performance of venture-capital backed investments
are increasing in the degree of competition if the entrepreneur’s contribution is more
important, and decreasing if the venture capitalist’s contribution is more important. By
contrast, if efforts are complements, the success probability, market value, and average
performance are hump-shaped functions of the degree of competition.
In an extension of the model, we consider projects (or entrepreneurs) of low and high
quality. Prior to making his investment, the venture capitalist can screen the project. We
show that venture capitalists screen more if the degree of competition is low, and less if
the degree of competition is high.
A caveat is in order here. The above implications are based on the notion that financial
claims have a first-order effect on incentives. While it is difficult to say what motivates
venture capitalists in practice, the following quote suggests that financial claims matter.2
In an investment memo regarding a company in the financial information in-
dustry, a venture capitalist outlines a number of actions that he will undertake
to assist the company. Among the risk factors which the venture capitalist
worries about is whether he “can [...] get enough money at work, or ownership
in the company, to warrant allocating these extra resources.”
Similarly, Kaplan and Strömberg (2001b) conclude that equity incentives increase the
likelihood that venture capitalists perform value-added support activities.
In the second part of the paper, we take the argument one step further and examine
factors that potentially affect the capital supply. We consider entry costs, public policy,
investment profitability, and market transparency. To investigate the role of these factors,
we endogenize the entry decision of venture capitalists, thereby endogenizing the degree
of competition in the capital market. An individual venture capitalist entering the market
does not take into account the effect of his entry on the overall level of competition, and
thus on the bargaining, contracting, and value creation in other ventures. Depending on
the level of competition prevailing in the market, entry by an individual venture capitalist
thus either creates a positive or negative contracting externality.
It is frequently argued that the short-run supply of informed capital is fixed, for it
takes time to develop the skills and experience which are necessary to be a good advisor
(Gompers and Lerner 1999). In an extension of the model, we assume that informed
capital is in short supply. There is, however, an abundant potential supply of portfolio
2We thank Per Strömberg for this quote.
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investors, i.e., investors who have capital but no expertise.3 We show that if the level of
competition is strong, portfolio investors not only fail to add value in their own ventures,
but also create a negative externality for the value added in ventures financed by (regular)
venture capitalists.
We believe our model of bargaining and search captures important features of real-
world venture capital contracting environments. In our model, deals are struck through
bilateral negotiations, and not through auctions or a Walrasian tâtonnement mechanism.
Both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists must actively look for deals. They can quit ne-
gotiations at any time and team up with somebody else. Finding a suitable partner takes
time, however, and is easier the greater the supply of potential partners relative to the
demand. Everyone is aware of his own and his partner’s outside options, and this affects
the outcome of the negotiations.4 Finally, search models have appealing economic proper-
ties. For instance, in our model outside options, and hence contracts, adjust gradually to
changes in the degree of competition. By contrast, in a Walrasian market the outcome is a
bang-bang solution where the shorter side of the market has the entire market power. This
can have extreme implications: if there are K venture capitalists and K−1 entrepreneurs,
entrepreneurs have the entire market power. If there are K + 1 entrepreneurs, however,
venture capitalists have the entire market power.
By embedding venture capital contracting in a market environment, our paper goes
beyond papers studying venture capital contracting in isolation. On the other hand, un-
like many of these papers, our simple model falls short of explaining the richness of cash
flow and control rights found in real-world venture capital contracts Michelacci and Suarez
(2000) also have a search-based model of start-up financing. Unlike our model, Michelacci
and Suarez do not consider incentive contracts or contracting inefficiencies. Instead, they
consider search inefficiencies, using an insight from the search literature that entry creates
externalities for the matching chances of other market participants. In Aghion, Bolton,
and Tirole (2000), the limited partners in a venture partnership (i.e., the investors) must
incentivize the venture capitalist to monitor an entrepreneur. Changes in market parame-
ters that close the gap between the venture capitalist’s private opportunity cost of capital
3There is evidence of inexperienced investors entering the venture capital industry at times when the
market is “hot”. For instance, the Economist notes: “[a] host of new entrants are now dabbling in venture
capital, ranging from ad hoc groups of MBAs to blue-blooded investment banks such as J.P. Morgan, to
sports stars and even the CIA.” “Money to Burn,” the Economist, May 27, 2000.
4Entrepreneurs typically strike better deals when the supply of capital is abundant. The following is a
statement comparing the boom period of the most recent venture capital cycle with the aftermath: “if you
went into a [...] start-up three to six months ago, you almost certainly got a very bad deal. Companies
could ask for anything they wanted [in terms of valuation]. Now entrepreneurs are much more realistic.”
“Open Season for Europe’s Turkeys,” Financial Times, January 11, 2001.
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and the investors’ cost of capital improve the efficiency of the incentive contract. Inderst
(2001) also examines the relationship between competition and contract design. Unlike
our paper, he considers screening contracts in an adverse selection framework. Finally,
we are not the first to note that constraints on transfer payments may impair contract
efficiency. Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Legros and Newman (2000) both discuss the
implications of this for the optimal allocation of control rights.
2 Non-Technical Overview
Section 3 presents the model. The model consists of three building blocks: i) financial
contracting, ii) bargaining, and iii) search. Section 3.1 studies a contracting problem
between an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist. The optimal contract is a combination of
equity and riskless debt.5 Both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist can exert effort.
Equilibrium effort levels depend on the way in which the equity is allocated between the
two. We first derive the utility possibility frontier generated by different equity allocations.
The undominated segment of the frontier is called equity frontier. We subsequently add the
riskless debt. The idea is to allocate the debt in a way that minimizes incentive distortions.
The utility possibility frontier generated by different Pareto-optimal contracts is called
bargaining frontier. In Section 3.2, the entrepreneur and venture capitalist bargain over
an optimal contract. We apply the generalized Nash bargaining solution. Reservation
values, i.e., outside options, are exogenous. In Section 3.3, we endogenize reservation
values by embedding the bargaining problem in a search market with pairwise matching.
Reservation values are determined by the market structure, or degree of competition, as
expressed by the ratio of venture capitalists to entrepreneurs in the market. The degree
of competition is assumed to be exogenous.
Section 4 summarizes the results. Via its effect on reservation values, the degree of
competition determines i) the optimal financial contract, ii) the net value created, i.e.,
the expected project return minus aggregate effort costs, iii) the gross surplus, which
corresponds to the market value of the venture if it was sold after effort and investment
costs are sunk but before returns are realized, iv) the expected, or average, performance
of the venture-backed investment, and v) the success probability of the venture, i.e., the
likelihood that the investment pays off more than it costs. We also study the role of
up-front payments.
Section 5 endogenizes the degree of competition by introducing free entry of capital.
5An alternative interpretation is that the entrepreneur and venture capitalist hold combinations of
common and straight preferred stock, or, with minor qualifications, participating convertible preferred
stock. Such claims are widely used in real-world venture capital contracts (Kaplan and Strömberg 2001a).
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We examine the way in which the degree of competition, and thus the optimal contract,
net value, etc., is affected by i) entry costs, ii) regulation and public policy, iii) investment
profitability, and iv) market transparency.
Section 6 considers projects of different quality. We investigate the impact of compe-
tition on the incentives of venture capitalists to screen projects ex ante.
Section 7 introduces a second class of investors: portfolio investors, i.e., investors who
have money but no skills. We examine the effect of entry by portfolio investors on the
performance of investments financed by (regular) venture capitalists.
Section 8 concludes. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
3 The Basic Model
3.1 Financial Contracting
The Basic Setup
A penniless entrepreneur has a project which requires an investment outlay I > 0.
Funding is provided by a venture capitalist. The project return is Xl ≥ 0 with probability
1−p and Xh > I > Xl with probability p. The success probability p = p (e, a) depends on
both the entrepreneur’s and the venture capitalist’s (unobservable) efforts e ∈ [0, 1] and
a ∈ [0, 1], respectively. The corresponding effort cost functions are cE (e) := e2/2αE and
cF (a) := a
2/2α. All agents are risk neutral.
The project return can be decomposed into a riskless return equal to Xl and a risky
return paying 0 in the bad state and ∆X := Xh −Xl in the good state. With the usual
degree of caution, we refer to these as debt and equity. An optimal contract between the
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist specifies i) the venture capitalist’s investment I, ii)
the debt 0 ≤ S ≤ Xl held by the venture capitalist, and iii) the fraction of equity s ∈ [0, 1]
held by the venture capitalist.6 In Section 4, we additionally admit up-front payments
by the venture capitalist. The entrepreneur keeps any return not paid to the venture
capitalist. The entrepreneur’s utility from the contract (s, S) is U (s, S) := u (s)+Xl−S,
where u (s) := p (1− s)∆X − e2/2αE represents his utility from the equity allocation s.
Likewise, the venture capitalist’s utility from the contract (s, S) is V (s, S) := v (s)+S−I,
where v (s) := ps∆X − a2/2α represents his utility from the equity allocation s.
To simplify the exposition, we proceed in two steps. We first derive the set of Pareto-
optimal u− v combinations. The utility possibility frontier generated by Pareto-optimal
equity allocations is called equity frontier. We then add the riskless debt and investment
6This rules out that one party receives a higher payment in the bad state than in the good state. It is
easy to show that such contracts are never optimal.
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cost and derive the set of Pareto-optimal U − V combinations. The utility possibility
frontier generated by Pareto-optimal contracts is called bargaining frontier.
The Equity Frontier
The equity frontier u = ψE (v) depicts the utilities u (s) and v (s) for all Pareto-
optimal equity allocations. In general, the precise shape of the equity frontier depends on
the production technology p (e, a) . There are, however, some robust properties that any
well-behaved equity frontier has. These are:
i) the equity frontier is strictly concave,
ii) the sum u (s) + v (s) attains its maximum in the interior of the domain, and
iii) along the equity frontier, v (s) is strictly increasing in s.
The first two properties follow naturally from the fact that the incentive problem is two-
sided and effort costs are strictly convex. Maximizing the sum of utilities then requires
balancing the two incentive problems. Giving one side too big an equity stake is inefficient
as it will then produce at a point where the marginal effort cost is relatively high. Ac-
cordingly, the equity allocation maximizing the total utility lies somewhere in the interior.
Denote the point where the total utility is maximized by (vˆ, uˆ), and the corresponding
equity allocation by sˆ. We occasionally refer to this as the joint-surplus maximizing, or
second-best, solution. Clearly, ψ0E (vˆ) = −1. The third property states that the venture
capitalist’s utility increases with his equity stake. Note that this need not be true for
dominated segments of the utility possibility frontier, i.e., segments that lie not on the
equity frontier. (See the following examples.)
We illustrate these properties by means of two examples. The first is based on the
linear technology p (e, a) = da+ (1− d) e used in, e.g., Casamatta (2000). The second is
based on the Cobb-Douglas technology p (e, a) = ade1−d used in, e.g., Repullo and Suarez
(2000). Under the linear technology, the two efforts are substitutes while under the Cobb-
Douglas technology, they are complements. While for the remainder of the paper we could
work with either of these technologies (or any other well-behaved technology), we instead
use the general notation u = ψE (v) and assume that properties i)−iii) hold. To make the
problem non-trivial, we assume that the second-best outcome is sufficiently good to allow
the venture capitalist to break even, i.e., that vˆ > I.
Example 1: Linear Technology. To ensure that the equilibrium success probabil-
ity has an interior solution, we assume that max {αE (1− d) ,αFd} < 1/∆X . Given some
equity allocation s, the corresponding equilibrium effort choices are a∗(s) = αFds∆X and
e∗(s) = αE (1− d) (1− s)∆X , respectively. The equilibrium success probability is
p∗(s) := p(e∗(s), a∗(s)) = ∆X
h
αFd
2s+ αE (1− d)2 (1− s)
i
. (1)
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The venture capitalist’s and entrepreneur’s utility from the equity allocation s is
v(s) =
1
2
αFd
2s2∆2X + αE (1− d)2 s (1− s)∆2X , (2)
and
u(s) =
1
2
αE (1− d)2 (1− s)2∆2X + α2Fd2s (1− s)∆2X , (3)
respectively.
Figure 1: Equity Frontier for Linear Technology.
Figure 1 depicts the utility possibility frontier generated by different equity allocations.
By increasing the venture capitalist’s equity share s from zero to one, we move along the
curve clockwise. In the picture, we assume that αE (1− d)2 > αFd2, i.e., the entrepreneur
is more productive than the venture capitalist. If the reverse holds or if productivities are
equal, the picture looks similar. Appendix A discusses all cases.
The equity frontier is the undominated segment of the utility possibility frontier. It
is defined on the interval [v, v], where in this example v = v(0) = 0 and v = v(s), where
s < 1. If s > s, the utility of both parties decreases with s, which is due to the fact that the
entrepreneur is more productive. Hence, even if the venture capitalist had all the market
power, he would want to leave the entrepreneur some rent. (If the venture capitalist were
more productive, the reverse would hold.) A formal derivation of the equity frontier and
a proof that properties i)−iii) hold is provided in Appendix A.
Example 2: Cobb-Douglas Technology. To ensure that the equilibrium success
probability has an interior solution, we assume again thatmax {αE (1− d) ,αFd} < 1/∆X .
Equilibrium effort choices are e∗(s) = (αE (1− d) (1− s)∆X [a∗(s)]d)
1
1+d and a∗(s) =
(αFds∆X [e
∗(s)]1−d)
1
2−d , implying that
p∗ (s) = ρ (s)∆X , (4)
where ρ (s) := [αFds]
d [αE(1− d)(1− s)]1−d . The venture capitalist’s and entrepreneur’s
utility from the equity allocation s is
v(s) =
1
2
(2− d) s∆2Xρ (s) , (5)
and
u(s) =
1
2
(1 + d) (1− s)∆2Xρ (s) . (6)
respectively.
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Figure 2: Equity Frontier for Cobb-Douglas Technology.
Figure 2 depicts the utility possibility and equity frontier for the Cobb-Douglas technol-
ogy. Since efforts are complements, only a relatively small segment of the utility possibility
frontier is undominated. In Appendix A we show that properties i)-iii) again hold.
The Bargaining Frontier
The bargaining frontier depicts the utility of the entrepreneur and venture capitalist,
U = u (s) +Xl − S and V = v (s) + S − I, respectively, for all Pareto-optimal contracts.
We construct the bargaining frontier from the equity frontier by adding the riskless debt
in a way that minimizes incentive distortions. (Adding the investment cost is trivial as it
is borne by the venture capitalist.) The construction is simple. Suppose s > sˆ, in which
case the venture capitalist holds too much and the entrepreneur too little equity relative
to the second-best. Any Pareto-optimal contract where s > sˆ must also have S = Xl,
i.e., the venture capitalist must hold the entire debt. If not, a Pareto-improvement would
be possible where the entrepreneur trades in debt for equity, thereby getting closer to the
second-best solution. Similarly, if s < sˆ, the entrepreneur must hold the entire debt. If
s = sˆ, any debt allocation is Pareto-optimal.
Figure 3: Construction of the Bargaining Frontier.
Figure 3 depicts the construction of the bargaining frontier.7 There are three regions.
In the left interval, the entrepreneur holds the entire debt and an inefficiently large fraction
of the equity. In the middle interval, both parties hold debt and equity. The equity
allocation is second-best optimal. As we move along the frontier clockwise, debt is shifted
to the venture capitalist until he holds all of it. As this is merely a wealth transfer, the
slope of the bargaining frontier in the middle interval is minus one. Finally, in the right
interval, the venture capitalist holds the entire debt and an inefficiently large fraction of
the equity.8 This is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The bargaining frontier takes the following form:
U = ψB(V ) :=

ψE(V + I) +Xl if V ∈ [max {v − I, 0} , vˆ − I]
ψE(vˆ) + [Xl − I + vˆ − V ] if V ∈ [vˆ − I, vˆ +Xl − I]
ψE(V −Xl + I) if V ∈ [vˆ +Xl − I, v +Xl − I]
. (7)
7The figure is based on the equity frontier in Figure 1. We therefore have v = 0, implying that
max {v − I, 0} = 0.
8While the bargaining frontier contains all relevant information, it is customary in bargaining theory
to start out with the bargaining set, which includes all feasible (i.e., including Pareto-dominated) utility
pairs. The bargaining set can be easily constructed from the bargaining frontier by allowing free disposal.
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3.2 Bargaining
It is reasonable to assume that when bargaining over a contract, the entrepreneur and
venture capitalist choose a contract that is Pareto-efficient. Bargaining over a contract
thus corresponds to choosing a utility pair (V,U) on the bargaining frontier. Let UR
and V R denote the entrepreneur’s and venture capitalist’s reservation values, or outside
options. For the moment we assume that reservation values are exogenous. In the following
section, we derive reservation values endogenously as a function of the supply and demand
in the capital market. We use the generalized Nash bargaining solution. Accordingly,
the entrepreneur and venture capitalist select utilities U = ψB(V ) ≥ UR and V ≥ V R
maximizing the Nash-product£
V − V R¤b £ψB(V )− UR¤1−b , (8)
where b ∈ (0, 1) . For convenience, define β := b/ (1− b).
As the bargaining frontier is strictly concave, the bargaining problem has a unique
solution. Denote this solution by
¡
V B, UB
¢
, where UB = ψB(V B).We can restrict atten-
tion to the case where V B ∈ (max {v − I, 0} , v +Xl − I) , i.e., where the solution lies in
the interior (see Appendix B, Proof of Proposition 1). It then follows from the first-order
condition that
β = −V
B − V R
UB − URψ
0
B(V
B), (9)
implying that V B is continuous and strictly increasing (decreasing) in V R (in UR).
As is well known, the axiomatic Nash bargaining solution can be derived as the limit
of a non-cooperative bargaining game where the two parties bargain with an open time
horizon under the risk of breakdown (Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky 1986). If β =
0.5, the two players alternate in making proposals or are chosen with equal probability
each period. If β 6= 0.5, the players are chosen with unequal probabilities. Finally, it
is worth noting that our results do not depend on the specifics of the Nash bargaining
solution. All we need for our results is that an agent’s bargaining utility is positively
related to his own and negatively related to his counterparty’s outside option.
3.3 Search
We finally embed the bargaining problem in a market environment. We consider a sta-
tionary search market populated by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. The measure
of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in the market is ME and MF , respectively. A
key variable is the ratio of venture capitalists to entrepreneurs, or degree of competition,
MF/ME =: θ. A high θ implies that the capital supply is strongly competitive.
11
Time is continuous. Both sides discount future utilities at interest rate r > 0. From
the perspective of a venture capitalist, the arrival rate of a deal is given by a decreasing
function q(θ), where limθ→0 q(θ) = ∞ and limθ→∞ q(θ) = 0. Hence a venture capitalist
is more likely to meet an entrepreneur in a given time interval if the ratio of venture
capitalists to entrepreneurs is low. It is convenient to assume that q(θ) is continuously
differentiable. Since the mass of deals per unit of time is MEq(θ), the arrival rate of a
deal from the perspective of an entrepreneur equals θq(θ), which is increasing in θ. Define
qF (θ) := q(θ) and qE(θ) := θq(θ).9
Example 3: Search Efficiency. Suppose the mass of deals per unit of time is
given by ξ[MEMF ]0.5, where ξ > 0 represents an efficiency measure. For instance, ξ could
be a measure of market transparency: matching is easier if the market is more transparent,
which, holding the market size fixed, results in more deals per unit of time. Given this
specification, arrival rates are qE(θ) = ξθ0.5 and qF (θ) = ξθ−0.5, respectively. We will
return to this matching technology in Section 5.4 below.
If the search is successful, the venture capitalist and entrepreneur bargain over a con-
tract.10 Reservation values derive from the standard asset value equations11
rUR = qE(θ)(U
B −UR), (10)
and
rV R = qF (θ)(V
B − V R). (11)
If the venture capitalist and entrepreneur reach an agreement, they leave the market.
9 In the search and matching literature, it is common to use as primitives the measure of matches per
unit of time, which is determind by the matching technology x(MF ,ME). Using the standard assumption
that the matching technology is homogeneous of degree one, we obtain q(θ) = x(MF ,ME)/MF .
10The model can be extended (e.g., by introducing heterogeneity or match complementarities) such that
on average, a suitable partner is found only after several unsuccessful visits.
11Outside options can be valued as assets. Consider the entrepreneur’s reservation value UR. The
(Poisson) arrival rate of a deal from the perspective of an entrepreneur is qE(θ). The probability that a
deal occurs in the next small time interval ∆ is thus qE(θ)∆. With probability 1− qE(θ)∆ no deal occurs,
and the entrepreneur continues searching. The expected discounted utility from searching is therefore
UR = qE(θ)∆ exp (−r∆)UB + (1− qE(θ)∆) exp (−r∆)UR.
Solving for UR and letting ∆→ 0 using L’Hôpital’s rule, we have
UR =
qE(θ)U
B
qE(θ) + r
.
Rearranging terms yields (10). The intuition for (11) is analogous.
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Stationarity requires that the inflow of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs matches
the respective outflow. Denote the measure of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists ar-
riving in the market over one unit of time by mE and mF , respectively. The market is
stationary if
qF (θ)MF =mF , (12)
and
qE(θ)ME = mE . (13)
As stationarity can always be ensured by scaling flows and stock accordingly, the market
is fully characterized by the ratio of venture capitalists to entrepreneurs θ.
We conclude by summarizing the equilibrium conditions.
Definition: Market Equilibrium. An equilibrium in the market with contracting,
bargaining, and search is defined by the following conditions.
i) Bargaining utilities
¡
V B, UB
¢
maximize the Nash product (8).
ii) Reservation values
¡
V R, UR
¢
satisfy the asset value equations (10)-(11).
iii) Flows (mE,mF ) and stocks (ME,MF ) satisfy the stationarity conditions (12)-(13).
To determine the equilibrium utilities V B, UB, V R, and UR, one must solve (9) and
(10)-(11) subject to UB = ψB(V B).
4 Results
4.1 Utilities, Financial Contracts, and Net Value Creation
Proposition 1 summarizes the main results. The key variable is the ratio of venture capital-
ists to entrepreneurs, or degree of competition θ. For each θ, there exists a unique optimal
contract, unique bargaining utilities
¡
V B, UB
¢
, and unique search utilitites
¡
V R, UR
¢
.
Proposition 1. For each θ there exists a unique equilibrium. There are three re-
gions: θ < θ (Region I, representing weak competition), θ ∈ £θ, θ¤ (Region II, representing
intermediate competition), and θ > θ (Region III, representing strong competition).
1) Utilities. The venture capitalist’s utility from a deal V B and his overall utility from
being in the market V R are both decreasing in θ. The converse holds for the entrepreneur.
2) Financial Contracts.
Region I: S = Xl and s > sˆ, i.e., the venture capitalist holds the entire debt and
an inefficiently large fraction of the equity compared to the second-best. The entrepreneur
holds no debt and an inefficiently small fraction of the equity.
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Region II: S ∈ [0,Xl] and s = sˆ, i.e., both parties hold debt and equity. The equity
allocation is second-best optimal.
Region III: S = 0 and s < sˆ, i.e., the venture capitalist holds no debt and an
inefficiently small fraction of the equity compared to the second-best. The entrepreneur
holds the entire debt and an inefficiently large fraction of the equity.
3) Changes in Financial Contracts.
Region I: An increase in θ leads to a decrease in the venture capitalist’s equity stake
and an increase in the entrepreneur’s equity stake. Debt holdings remain constant.
Region II: An increase in θ leads to a decrease in the venture capitalist’s debt and an
increase in the entrepreneur’s debt. Equity stakes remain constant.
Region III: see Region I.
4) Net Value Creation. The net value created UB + V B is increasing in θ in Region
I, constant in Region II, and decreasing in θ in Region III.
The proof is in Appendix B. We proceed with a discussion.
Utilities. Bargaining and search utilities both move in the same direction. Consider,
for instance, the entrepreneur. An increase in θ makes it easier for him to find a coun-
terparty, which reduces his cost of delay. Hence UR increases (and V R decreases), which
implies the bargaining outcome shifts in favor of the entrepreneur. The increase in UB,
in turn, feeds back into the search market dynamics. As the utility from doing a deal has
gone up, searching for a deal becomes more valuable. UR therefore increases again, which
shifts the bargaining outcome further, and so on. All together, an increase in θ implies
that we move along the bargaining frontier counterclockwise.
Financial Contracts. Regions I-III correspond to the three intervals in Figure 3 (in
reverse order). The idea is to transfer utility in a way that minimizes incentive distortions.
In Region I, the degree of competition and hence the entrepreneur’s bargaining position
are weak, implying that the bulk of the project return goes to the venture capitalist. At
the margin, it is better to pay the venture capitalist with debt than with equity, for his
equity stake is already too high compared to the second-best. Consequently, as θ increases,
efficiency dictates that utility be transferred by reducing the venture capitalist’s equity
stake. If s = sˆ, we enter Region II. In this region, the equity allocation is second-best
optimal. As θ increases, efficiency dictates that the venture capitalist’s debt be reduced
and the equity allocation remains constant. If S = 0, this possibility is exhausted, and we
enter Region III. The only way to transfer utility to the entrepreneur is now to reduce s,
which worsens efficiency as the venture capitalist’s equity stake in this region is already
inefficiently low.
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Net Value Creation. Consider again Figure 3. The result follows immediately from
the fact that in Region I the bargaining frontier has slope ψ0B < −1, in Region II it has
slope ψ0B = −1, and in Region III it has slopeψ0B > −1.
Perhaps the main insight to be taken away is that equity is used to transfer utility if
the level of competition is either low or high, while riskless debt is used to transfer utility
if the level of competition is intermediate. Accordingly, the equity component of venture
capital contracts should be relatively stable for intermediate competition levels, but vary
substantially with changes in competition if competition is either weak or strong. The
opposite holds for the debt component. In relative terms, Proposition 1 implies that the
fraction of the entrepreneur’s compensation consisting of debt is a U-shaped function of
the competition level. Conversely, the fraction of the venture capitalist’s compensation
consisting of debt is a hump-shaped function of the competition level.
4.2 Market Value, Performance, and Success Probability
The gross value p (e, a)∆X + Xl represents the expected project return after effort and
investment costs are sunk, but before returns are realized. It measures the average per-
formance of venture-backed investments, assuming that effort costs cannot be observed.
In monetary terms, it represents the fair value realized by the entrepreneur and venture
capitalist if the firm was sold at an interim date. We shall refer to p (e, a)∆X +Xl as the
market (or IPO) value of the venture.
In our model, the market value and the average performance depend on s or θ in the
same way as the success probability p (e, a) . Unlike the net value UB + V B, the success
probability is not necessarily a hump-shaped function of s and θ. Its functional behavior
depends on whether the two efforts are complements or substitutes. For illustrative pur-
poses, consider the CES family p (e, a) = (daρ + (1− d) eρ) 1ρ , where ρ ≤ 1 and d ∈ (0, 1) .
The parameter ρmeasures the degree of complementarity between the two efforts. If ρ = 1
the CES technology coincides with the linear technology, whereas if ρ→ 0 the isoquants
of the CES technology approach those of the Cobb-Douglas technology. As ρ decreases,
the degree of complementarity between e and a increases.
If ρ < 1 efforts are complements. It is straightforward to show that the equilibrium
success probability p∗(s) is then a hump-shaped function of s with interior maximum
sp :=
1
1 + φ
, where φ :=
"µ
αE
αF
¶ρ
2
µ
1− d
d
¶# 11−ρ
.
The parameter φ > 0 measures the relative productivity of the entrepreneur compared
to the venture capitalist. If φ > 1 the entrepreneur is more productive, which means his
effort is less costly and/or the success probability is more responsive to his effort, implying
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that his contribution is more important. If φ < 1 the venture capitalist is more productive,
and if φ = 1 productivities are equal. By inspection, the peak of p∗(s) lies further to the
left the greater the entrepreneur’s productivity relative to that of the venture capitalist.
If productivities are equal, the peak is at sp = 1/2.
If ρ = 1 efforts are substitutes. We showed in Example 1 that the success probability
p∗(s) is then a monotonic function of s. If φ > 1 the function is strictly decreasing, while
if φ < 1 it is strictly increasing. If the entrepreneur is more productive, the success
probability is thus maximized at sp = 0. Conversely, if the venture capitalist is more
productive, the success probability is maximized at sp = 1. (This result can be obtained
directly by maximizing (1) with respect to s.)
To establish the relation between market value, average performance, and success prob-
ability on the one side and competition on the other, recall that the venture capitalist’s
equity stake is a weakly decreasing function of θ, with a flat segment in Region II. Ac-
cordingly, if efforts are complements the market value, average performance, and success
probability are all hump-shaped functions of the competition level (with a flat segment).
On the other hand, if efforts are substitutes they are either weakly increasing (if φ > 1)
or weakly decreasing (if φ < 1) functions of the competition level.
4.3 Up-front Payments
Suppose in addition to financing the investment cost I, the venture capitalist can make
an up-front payment P ∈ ¡0, P ¤ . (It is reasonable to assume that the entrepreneur cannot
make a noteworthy up-front payment). Like riskless debt, up-front payments can be
used to transfer utility without affecting incentives. Consequently, the middle, i.e., linear,
segment of the bargaining frontier will extend to the left. There are two cases: if P ≥ vˆ−I
the left segment vanishes completely. By contrast, if 0 < P < vˆ − I all three segments of
the bargaining frontier remain. The following result is then immediate.
Proposition 2. Suppose up-front payments can take values P ∈ ¡0, P ¤ .
i) If P < vˆ − I Proposition 1 holds as is. The middle segment of the bargaining
frontier is defined on V ∈ [vˆ− I −P, vˆ+Xl− I], while the leftmost segment is defined on
V ∈ [max©v − I − P, 0ª , vˆ − I − P ].
ii) If P ≥ vˆ − I Region II extends to all θ ≥ θ, implying that Region III disappears.
The middle segment of the bargaining frontier is defined on V ∈ [0, vˆ +Xl − I].
Introducing up-front payments has either no effect (P is small), or it causes Regions
II and III to collapse into a single region (P is large), which has the same properties as
Region II. From our perspective, what is important is that up-front payments have no
effect on Region I. As the venture capitalist’s equity stake in this region is inefficiently
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high, efficiency dictates that utility be transferred by reducing his equity stake. Hence
even if up-front payments are possible, they will not be used. Introducing (potentially
large) up-front payments therefore does not affect our main conclusions: it is still true
that for some competition levels equity is used to transfer utility, while for others riskless
debt (or up-front payments) is used. A change in the level of competition still affects
incentives, and thus the net value, success probability, market value, and performance of
ventures. Likewise, it still holds that for some competition levels one side holds a mix
of debt and equity and the other holds straight equity, while for other competition levels
both sides hold a mix. The literature appears to favor the view that up-front payments
should be small or even zero:
1) The promise to make up-front payments may attract a large pool of fraudulent
entrepreneurs, or “fly-by-night operators” (Rajan), who take the money and run (Rajan
1992, von Thadden 1995. In the context of venture capital: Hellmann 2001). According
to this argument, up-front payments should be zero.
2) Up-front payments may be limited due to incentive problems between the venture
capitalist and his providers of capital (Holmström and Tirole 1997, Michelacci and Suarez
2000). To mitigate the problem, the venture capitalist must put up a fraction of his own
wealth, which is arguably limited. Indeed, covenants in venture partnerships frequently
require the “venture capitalist to invest a set dollar amount or percentage in every invest-
ment made by the fund” (Gompers and Lerner 1999, p. 40).
3) As the claims of limited partners in venture partnerships are senior, the claim of the
general partner (i.e., the venture capitalist) has features of a call option. To counteract
risk-taking by the venture capitalist, partnership agreements frequently include restrictions
imposing “a maximum percentage of capital invested in the fund [...] that can be invested
in any one firm” (Gompers and Lerner 1999, p. 38).
5 Endogenous Capital Supply
5.1 Closing the Model: Endogenous Entry
So far we have assumed that the ratio of venture capitalists to entrepreneurs, or degree
of competition, is exogenous. While this may be an adequate description of the market
in the short run, the long-run supply of venture capital is likely to be elastic. In what
follows, we endogenize the supply side of venture capital, thereby endogenizing the degree
of competition in the market. This allows us to study the relationship between venture
capital contracts, the performance and value creation of ventures, and various exogenous
factors. The factors are entry costs, government subsidies and regulation, investment
profitability, and market transparency.
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We take as given the flow of new ideas that are continuously created in the economy.
Each idea is associated with a single entrepreneur and cannot be traded. We normalize
the flow of new ideas such that the mass mE = 1 of ideas is created in the market over
one unit of time. The inflow of venture capital is determined by a zero-profit constraint.
We assume that venture capitalists entering the market incur entry costs k > 0, which
may be conveniently thought of as the cost of raising capital or acquiring information.
Zero profit then implies that V R = k : to recoup entry costs, venture capitalists must
realize a positive utility in the market. While we make the simplifying assumption that
each venture capitalist can finance at most one project, all our results hold if venture
capitalists can finance a finite number of projects. The equilibrium conditions are the
same as before, except that mE = 1 and V R = k.
While it seems reasonable to assume that the supply of venture capital adjusts more
quickly to changes in market conditions than the supply of new ideas, our model can be
easily extended to incorporate endogenous entry by both venture capitalists and entrepre-
neurs. Suppose, for instance, that entrepreneurs face entry costs c ∈ [0, c]. These costs
may, e.g., reflect initial R&D or the cost of setting up a business plan. Otherwise all
projects are identical. If c is sufficiently large, there exists a threshold cˆ < c such that
only entrepreneurs with cost c ≤ cˆ enter the market. This setup, in particular, generates
the same results as the one considered here.
5.2 Financing Costs
In our model, venture capitalists face two costs of providing finance: entry costs k and
investment costs I. In what follows, we examine how changes in each of these costs
affect the degree of competition in the market. We first consider changes in entry costs.
Subsequently, we consider regulatory changes and public policy towards venture capital,
which affect both entry and investment costs.
Entry Costs
The venture capital industry is highly cyclical. In the past decades, there have been
two cycles: one starting in the late 1970s and ending in the late 1980s, the other starting in
the early 1990s. Each cycle witnessed entry by new venture capital funds: between 1991
and 1999 alone, the number of independent venture capital funds in the United States
increased from 34 to 204. A factor potentially related to this massive entry of funds are
changes in entry costs. As more information about a technology or product becomes
available, both the cost of information acquisition and the uncertainty premium required
by investors fall, implying that entry costs decrease.
Consider the implications of a decrease in entry cost for the entry decision of venture
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capitalists.12 From the equality V R = k we have that V R must decrease by the same
amount. By Proposition 1, this implies that the degree of competition θ must rise.13
Proposition 3. For each level of entry cost k, there exists a unique equilibrium. A
decrease in k corresponds to an increase in the level of competition θ and vice versa. The
effects on utilities and financial contracts are the same as in Proposition 1.
The proof is in Appendix B. Analogous to Proposition 1, there exist three regions:
k > k (Region I), k ∈ £k, k¤ (Region II), and k < k (Region III). In each region, the
respective statements from Proposition 1 hold. Among other things, this implies that the
net value created in ventures is a hump-shaped function of entry costs: if entry costs are
high, there are too few venture capitalists relative to the second-best. If entry costs are
low, there are too many venture capitalists. An individual venture capitalist entering the
market does not take into account the effect of his entry on the overall level of competition,
and hence on the bargaining, contracting, and value creation in other ventures. Entry by
an individual venture capitalist therefore either creates a positive (if there are too few
venture capitalists) or negative (if there are too many) contracting externality.
Regulation and Public Policy
In 1978 the United States abandoned the “prudent man rule”, a rule that prohibited
pension fund investments in securities issued by venture capital funds. The regulatory
change was accompanied by a cut in the capital gains tax from 49.5 to 28 percent. In 1981
taxes were cut further to 20 percent.14 These changes triggered a surge in the supply of
venture capital: commitments to private equity partnerships during 1980-82 totaled more
than $3.5 billion, two and a half times the commitments to private equity during the entire
decade of the 1970s.
Around the world, public programs have been designed to stimulate venture capital
investment. In the United States, the bulk of these activities takes place on the state
and local level (Florida and Smith 1992). In Europe, the I-TEC project sponsored by
the European Union subsidizes initial (i.e., appraisal and management) costs, and the
European Investment Fund provides subsidized investment loans. The intention of these
programs is not to replace, but to stimulate the private provision of venture capital.
To examine the effect of investment subsidies, suppose they reduce the investment cost
by γI. As the venture capitalist’s investment outlay is now only (1− γ) I, fewer financial
claims are needed to make him break even. An increase in γ therefore either reduces the
12The market will only open up if venture capitalists can potentially break even, i.e., if v +Xl − I > k.
We assume that this holds.
13We only consider stationary states, not the adjustment process that leads to these states.
14Fenn, Liang, and Prowse (1995) provide a detailed account of the events.
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venture capitalist’s equity stake s or his debt holdings S, whichever is more efficient.15 (If
s > sˆ a decrease in s is more efficient, while if s ≤ sˆ a decrease in S is more efficient).
Proposition 4. An investment subsidy γI has the same effect on financial contracts
as an (exogenous) increase in the degree of competition θ or a decrease in entry cost k.
The proof is in Appendix B. Of course, government can also directly subsidize or tax
entry, thus changing entry costs. The effect is then as described in Proposition 3.
5.3 Investment Profitability
Another factor that might potentially trigger a positive influx of venture capital is an
increase in investment profitability. In our model, an increase in investment profitability
can mean a number of things: an increase in ∆X or Xl, or a decrease in I. In either case,
the bargaining frontier shifts outward. In what follows, we show that if an increase in
profitability brings about a change in the type of financial contract, i.e., if we move across
the three regions in Proposition 1, the only possible direction is from Region I to Region
II to Region III. This is the same direction as in the case of an exogenous increase in the
degree of competition θ or a decrease in entry cost k. The result does not depend on the
particular source of profitability increase.
The argument proceeds in two steps. First, it is reasonable to assume that the relative
importance of the entrepreneur’s and venture capitalist’s contribution does not change as
the investment becomes more profitable. Formally, this implies that the ratio of second-
best utilities vˆ/uˆ remains unchanged. Second, as the investment becomes more profitable,
a smaller share of the proceeds is needed to make the venture capitalist break even. As
an illustration, suppose we are in Region III where s < sˆ and S = 0. The only way to
reduce the venture capitalist’s share of the proceeds is to reduce his equity stake s. As
vˆ/uˆ is unchanged, this implies we must still be in Region III, for moving to Region II or
I would have required giving the venture capitalist more equity. Similar arguments hold
if we are in Regions I or II. The proof of the following result is in Appendix B.
Proposition 5. Holding the ratio of second-best utilities vˆ/uˆ fixed, an increase in
investment profitability changes the type of financial contract in the same way as an (ex-
ogenous) increase in the degree of competition θ or a decrease in entry cost k.
15Technically, an increase in γ shifts the bargaining frontier to the right. There are two effects at work.
First, V B increases, implying that θ must increase since V R = k. Second, UB increases, implying that
either s or S must decrease. Both effects counteract the increase in γ, hence ensuring that V R = k.
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5.4 Market Transparency
So far we have studied changes affecting the costs and returns to financing. The market
for venture financing itself may undergo changes, however. In this section, we study how
a change in market transparency affects optimal financial contracts. We use the Cobb-
Douglas matching technology introduced in Example 3. According to this specification,
the mass of new deals per unit of time is ξ[MEMF ]0.5, where ξ > 0 is a measure of market
transparency, or more generally, market efficiency.
Consider first the case where the degree of competition θ is exogenous. Inserting the
reservation values (10)-(11) in the first-order condition for the Nash product (9), we obtain
β
r + ξθ−
1
2
r + ξθ
1
2
= −ψB(V B) V
B
ψ(V B)
. (14)
Differentiating V B with respect to ξ while holding θ fixed shows that if θ < 1, i.e.,
if entrepreneurs outnumber venture capitalists, an increase in transparency increases the
bargaining utility of venture capitalists. Conversely, if θ > 1 an increase in transparency
reduces V B. Intuitively, the greater the market transparency, the stronger is the impact of
competition, or relative supply and demand, on the bargaining outcome. As this benefits
the short side of the market, its bargaining utility increases. Second, implicitly differen-
tiating (9) reveals that the cross-derivative of V B with respect to θ and ξ is negative. In
words, the greater the market transparency, the faster we move along the bargaining fron-
tier as the level of competition changes. Again, a greater market transparency amplifies
the impact of market structure on the bargaining outcome. To summarize, the effect of
an exogenous change in θ on contracts and utilities described in Proposition 1 is more
pronounced the greater the market transparency.
In the case where entry is endogenous, the effect of transparency on the bargaining
utilities is ambiguous if θ < 1, but unambiguous if θ > 1. Consider, for instance, the effect
on V B. There are two effects. First, we know from the above discussion that an increase
in transparency has a positive effect on V B if θ < 1 and a negative effect if θ > 1. Second,
an increase in transparency reduces frictions and therefore the cost of delay. In principle,
this implies that the venture capitalist’s overall utility from being the market, V R, must
rise. But V R cannot rise as it is determined by the equality V R = k. To ensure that V R
remains constant, the bargaining utility V B must therefore decrease. Accordingly, there
are two forces driving V B. If θ > 1 they move in the same direction, whereas if θ < 1
they move in the opposite direction. This is summarized in the following proposition. The
proof is in Appendix B.
Proposition 6. If entry costs k are low (implying that θ > 1), an increase in market
transparency has the same effects on financial contracts and bargaining utilities as an
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(exogenous) increase in the degree of competition θ or a decrease in entry cost k. If entry
costs are high, the effect is ambiguous.
6 Ex-Ante Project Screening
Thus far we have focused on two functions ascribed to venture capitalists: providing capital
and coaching projects. We now turn to a third, equally important function: separating
good ideas from bad ones. While entrepreneurs are always optimistic about their ideas,
venture capitalists, due to their experience and industry knowledge, are likely to have a
better sense of whether a given idea is workable or not. Suppose projects come in two
qualities, or types: t ∈ T := {L,H}. The probability that a project (or entrepreneur) is
of a high quality is π ∈ (0, 1] . Only high-quality projects are profitable. For simplicity,
suppose a low-quality project yields a zero return for sure. A priori, neither the venture
capitalist nor the entrepreneur knows the project’s quality. The venture capitalist can,
however, learn it by screening the project. Screening comes at a cost C > 0.
In what follows, we will argue that venture capitalists are less likely to screen projects
if the level of competition is strong. This is consistent with casual evidence that tapping
venture capital is easier in times when the venture capital market is booming.16 Before
stating the result, let us briefly lay out the argument. Each venture capitalist can finance
and coach only a certain number of projects. For simplicity, we assume in our model that
this number is one. Before sinking time and capital into a particular project, a venture
capitalist will weigh the benefit from doing so against the opportunity cost from (not)
searching for a better candidate. If the opportunity cost is high, the venture capitalist
will carefully screen the project before making the investment. If the opportunity cost if
low, the benefits from screening are also low. Recall that the utility from searching is V R.
Since V R = k, we have that the venture capitalist is more likely to screen if entry costs
are high, or alternatively, if the degree of competition is low.
The sequence of moves is as follows. The venture capitalist and the entrepreneur
bargain over a contract which grants the venture capitalist the right to withdraw if he
finds out that the project is of low quality. Subsequently, the venture capitalist decides
whether to screen or not. If he screens, he learns the project quality for sure. If he does
not screen, he holds prior beliefs that he faces a high-quality project with probability
π.17 If the venture capitalist does not withdraw, he sinks the investment cost I. After the
investment cost is sunk, the project quality is fully revealed. The last assumption simplifies
the analysis as it implies that effort choices are made under complete information.
16See “Finance is a Siren Song,” Financial Times, March 13, 2000.
17This particular sequence of moves is chosen to avoid bargaining with private information
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In a slight abuse of notation, denote the venture capitalist’s expected utility from
investing in a high-quality project by V B. If the venture capitalist screens and finds out
that the quality is low, it is optimal for him not to invest and to search anew. Moreover,
as a low-quality project generates a zero return, it does not pay an entrepreneur who
has been rejected to stay in the market.18 The expected utility from screening is then
πV B+(1−π)k−C. By contrast, the expected utility from not screening is πV B−(1−π)I.
Consequently, screening is optimal if and only if
C ≤ (1− π)(k + I). (15)
From Proposition 3, we know that for each entry cost k there exists a unique corresponding
competition level θ. We thus have the following result.
Proposition 7. Ceteris paribus, screening is more likely if i) the cost of screening is
low, ii) the fraction of low-type projects is large, iii) the investment outlay (which is lost
if a low-quality project is financed) is large, and iv) entry cost k are high, or alternatively,
the degree of competition θ is low.
7 Portfolio Investors vs. Advisors
Gompers and Lerner (1999, p.4) point out that “[t]he skills needed for successful venture
capital investing are difficult and time-consuming to acquire. During periods when the
supply or demand for venture capital has shifted, adjustments in the number of venture
capitalists and venture capital organizations appear to take place very slowly.” The con-
sequences of this are particular apparent in boom periods such as the 1990s, where the
demand for venture capital increased sharply. In an attempt to fill the gap, an increasing
number of new, inexperienced investors entered the market.19 In this section, we model
both the short-run stickiness of informed capital and the entry by inexperienced investors
who have money but no skills. We call the latter portfolio investors.
Portfolio investors may be viewed as agents whose cost of providing effort is infinitely
high. To distinguish between regular venture capitalists and portfolio investors, we use the
subscripts f ∈ F := {A,P} , where A stands for advisor. There are two main differences
between the bargaining frontiers ψB,A and ψB,P . First, the fact that advisors add value
while portfolio investors do not shifts ψB,A outward relative to ψB,P . Second, unlike ψB,A,
the bargaining frontier with portfolio investors is strictly concave with slope ψ0B,P < −1
18This rules out the existence of (negative) pool externalities. See Broecker (1990) for details.
19 See “Banks Seek to Mine a Rich Seam: Private Equity”, Financial Times, June 30, 2000, as well as
the reference in footnote 2.
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everywhere. As the moral hazard problem is only one-sided, efficiency dictates that port-
folio investors hold as little equity as possible. Accordingly, utility should be transferred
by reducing the portfolio investor’s equity stake. The bargaining frontier does not have
a linear segment since the second-best allocation sˆP = 0 is not feasible. (sˆP = 0 implies
vˆP = 0, which in turn implies vˆP +Xl − I < 0.)
As before, we assume that the mass mE = 1 of new ideas is created in the market over
one unit of time. We now additionally assume that over the same time period, the mass
m < 1 of advisors arrives at the market fringe, where they must decide whether to enter
or not.20 The inflow of portfolio capital is endogenous and determined by a zero-profit
constraint. (The formal equilibrium conditions, which extend the definitions in Sections
3.3 and 5.1, are stated in Appendix C.) To ensure that portfolio investors can potentially
break even, we assume that vP +Xl − I > k . That is, the bargaining utility of portfolio
investors under the most favorable bargaining outcome must be sufficiently large to cover
the entry cost k. The following result shows that Proposition 3 extends to multiple investor
types. The proof is in Appendix C.
Proposition 8. For each entry cost k, there exists a unique equilibrium where both
types of investors enter. Analogous to Proposition 3, a decrease in k raises the level of
competition θ and reduces the bargaining utility of both advisors and portfolio investors.
As for ventures between entrepreneurs and advisors, the effect on financial contracts (and
thus on incentives and value creation) is the same as in Proposition 1. As for ventures
between entrepreneurs and portfolio investors, a decrease in k leads to a decrease in the
portfolio investor’s equity stake and an increase in the entrepreneur’s equity stake. The
portfolio investor holds the entire debt, and his debt holdings remain constant throughout.
Entry by an individual portfolio investor raises the overall level of competition. The
extent to which this entails a positive or negative (contracting) externality depends on
whether we consider ventures with advisors or portfolio investors. As for ventures be-
tween entrepreneurs and portfolio investors, the externality is unambiguously positive. As
competition increases, utility is transferred to the entrepreneur by reducing the portfolio
investor’s equity stake. Since the moral hazard problem is one-sided, this improves effi-
ciency. Also, both the market value and the success probability increase. With regard to
ventures between entrepreneurs and advisors, the result is ambiguous. We showed in Sec-
tion 5.2 that the externality is positive if competition is weak but negative if competition
is strong. In the latter case, entry by portfolio investors reduces the net value in ventures
financed by advisors and, provided efforts are complements, also the market value and
success probability in these ventures.
20 If m > 1, we are back to the previous setting. If m = 1, there exist multiple equilibria.
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Being unskilled, portfolio investors have no advantage vis-a-vis advisors in our model.
In practice, this need not be the case. For instance, portfolio investors might have access
to cheaper funding, e.g., from in-house sources. On the other hand, advisors might have
both better and cheaper access to industry-specific information. In a young industry where
the information acquisition problem is important, advisors may thus face lower entry cost.
By contrast, in a mature industry portfolio investors may face lower entry costs. Given
these assumptions, our model has the following implication: as entry costs decrease and
the relative cost advantage of portfolio investors increases, advisors are driven out of
the market. The reason for this is that i) portfolio investors eventually face lower entry
costs, and, more interestingly, ii) the increase in competition and the associated negative
contracting externality decrease the surplus produced by advisors.
8 Concluding Remarks
Our paper yields numerous empirical predictions relating venture capital contracts, the
intensity of ex-ante project screening, and the value, success probability, and performance
of venture-backed investments to the relative supply and demand for venture capital (or
degree of capital market competition), entry costs, market transparency, investment prof-
itability, and public policy. To our knowledge, none of these predictions have been tested.
However, Gompers and Lerner (2000) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2001a) both provide
evidence consistent with our model. Kaplan and Strömberg find that the entrepreneur’s
equity stake increases with investment performance, which is consistent with Proposition
5. Gompers and Lerner find that pre-money valuations are higher in periods of strong
capital inflows and competition, which is consistent with the notion that competition shifts
surplus to entrepreneurs. The authors also examine the relation between competition and
the success of ventures. They find no statistically significant difference for investments
made during the late 1980s, a period when competition was strong, and the early 1990s,
a period of relatively low inflows. This is consistent with the hump-shaped relation sug-
gested by our model (if efforts are complements), which predicts that the success rate is
low if competition is either strong or weak. It is, however, also consistent with the hypoth-
esis that there is no relation between competition and success. To discriminate between
these two hypotheses, more than two periods will be needed.
Our model can be extended in several directions. As it stands, the focus is on cash-
flow rights. Real-world venture capital contracts, however, include cash-flow rights, voting
rights, liquidation rights, board rights, and other instruments (Kaplan and Strömberg
2001a). One conceivable extension is to examine how changes in competition affect the
mix of different contractual provisions. Again, the underlying principle must be that
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utility is transferred in a way that minimizes incentive distortions. Second, we treat
venture capitalists as a single entity. In practice, venture capital partnerships consist of
general and limited partners, which are tied together by a contract. It would be interesting
to analyze how competition simultaneously affects both types of contracts, i.e., contracts
between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs and contracts between the general and
limited partners. The question is whether the two contracts move in the same or opposite
direction.Third, we do not allow for project choice. Suppose there is a choice between
projects that rely heavily on the effort of venture capitalists and projects that do not. If
competition is strong and venture capitalists’ equity stakes are inefficiently small, it will
become optimal for venture capitalists to move away from effort-intensive activities such
as early-stage seed financing toward less effort-intensive activities.
9 Appendix
9.1 Appendix A: Specific Production Technologies
Example 1: Linear Technology. The equity frontier derives from the following pro-
gram: the entrepreneur choose s to maximize u (s) subject to the constraint that v (s) ≥ v.
The solution is characterized for all feasible reservation values v ≥ 0. (If v is too large,
the solution is not feasible). In a slight abuse of notation, we denote the solution by
s∗(v). Both v(s) and u(s) are strictly quasiconcave. Accordingly, s∗ is a solution to the
entrepreneur’s problem if and only if v(s) is nondecreasing and u(s) is nonincreasing at
s∗. Define
s :=
αFd
2 − αE (1− d)2
2αFd2 − αE (1− d)2
,
and
s :=
αE (1− d)2
2αE (1− d)2 − αFd2
,
where 0 < s < s < 1. We obtain the following result:
i) if αE (1− d)2 > αFd2, the set of Pareto-optimal equity allocations is [0, s] ,
ii) if αE (1− d)2 = αFd2, the set of Pareto-optimal equity allocations is [0, 1] , and
iii) if αE (1− d)2 < αFd2, the set of Pareto-optimal equity allocations is [s, 1] .
Case i) is the case discussed in the text where the entrepreneur is more productive. In
case i), define v := 0 and v =: v(s). In case ii), define v := 0 and v := v(1). Finally, in
case iii), define v := v(s) and v := v(1). For any v ∈ [v, v], the solution s∗(v) satisfies
v =
1
2
αFd
2 (s∗(v))2∆2X + αE (1− d)2 s∗(v) (1− s∗(v))∆2X . (16)
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Solving (16) for s∗(v), we obtain
s∗(v) =
αE (1− d)2∆X −Φ³
2αE (1− d)2 − αFd2
´
∆X
, (17)
where Φ :=
q
α2E (1− d)4∆2X − 2v(2αE (1− d)2 − αFd2). Clearly, s∗(v) is strictly in-
creasing. Inserting (17) in (3) generates the equity frontier ψE (v) . Differentiating ψE (v)
twice with respect to v, we have
d2ψE(v)
dv2
= −Φ−3
·³
αE (1− d)2 − αFd2
´2
+ αE (1− d)2 αFd2
¸
< 0.
To show that the sum of utilities v + ψE(v) attains its maximum in the interior of [v, v],
we compute the derivative of ψE (v) at the boundaries. In case i), we have ψ0E(v) =
[αFd
2 − αE (1− d)2]/[αE (1− d)2] > −1 and limv→v ψ0E(v) = −∞. In case ii), we have
ψ0E(v) = 0 and limv→v ψ
0
E(v) = −∞. Finally, in case iii), we have ψ0E(v) = 0 and
ψ0E(v) = −αFd2/[αFd2 − αE (1− d)2] < −1. Since ψE(v) is strictly concave, this implies
that in each case there exists a unique vˆ ∈ (v, v) such that ψ0E (vˆ) = −1. Q.E.D.
Example 2: Cobb-Douglas Technology. Again, v(s) and u(s) are both quasi-
concave, implying that s∗ solves the entrepreneur’s problem for some v if and only if v (s)
is nondecreasing and u (s) is nonincreasing at s∗. Differentiating (5) with respect to s, we
have that v (s) is nondecreasing if and only if s ≤ [1 + d]/2. Similarly, differentiating (6)
with respect to s, we have that u (s) is nonincreasing if and only if s ≥ d/2. Accordingly,
the set of Pareto-optimal equity allocations is [d/2, [1 + d]/2], implying that v := v(d/2)
and v := v([1 + d]/2). Moreover, v (s) is strictly increasing for all s < [1 + d]/2, implying
that s∗(v) is strictly increasing for all v < v. We next show that ψE is strictly concave.
Differentiating u(s) and v(s) twice, we obtain
d2ψE(v)
dv2
= −1
2
(1 + d)∆2Xρ (s
∗(v))
µ
1
v0(s∗(v))
¶2
·
µ
d
(s∗(v))2
+
(1− d) (2s∗(v)− d)
s∗(v) (1− s∗(v)) (1 + d− 2s∗(v))
¶
,
which is strictly negative for all s∗ ∈ [d/2, (1 + d)/2]. To show that the sum of utilities
v+ψE(v) attains its maximum in the interior of [v, v], we compute the derivative of ψE (v)
at the boundaries. The derivative of ψE (v) is
dψE(v)
dv
= −(1 + d) (2s
∗(v)− d) (1− s∗(v))
s∗(v) (2− d) (1 + d− 2s∗(v)) . (18)
Evaluating (18) at v and v, we obtain ψ0E(v) = 0 and limv→v ψ
0
E(v) = −∞. Since ψE (v)
is strictly concave, this implies there exists a unique vˆ ∈ (v, v) such that ψ0E (vˆ) = −1.
Q.E.D.
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9.2 Appendix B: Proofs of Propositions 1 and 3-6
Proof of Proposition 1. To apply the first-order condition (9), we must first show that
the bargaining outcome lies in the interior of the domain of ψB. Given that V R ≥ 0 and
UR ≥ 0, there are only two possible cases where this might not hold: if v − I > 0 and
ψ0B(v − I) < 0, and if ψB(v + Xl − I) > 0 and limV→v+Xl−I ψ0B(V ) > −∞. To show
that these cases cannot arise, we argue to a contradiction. Suppose that v − I > 0 and
ψ0B(v − I) < 0, implying that s∗(v) > 0. But ψ0E(v) = u0(s∗)/v0(s∗), ψ0E(v) < 0, and
Pareto optimality imply that u0(s∗(v)) < 0. Hence there exists some equity allocation
s < s∗(v) which makes the entrepreneur better off, contradicting the construction of ψE,
which requires that u (s) is maximized at s∗(v). An analogous argument holds for the
second case.
We next prove uniqueness. Inserting (10)-(11) into (9) yields
β
r + qF (θ)
r + qE(θ)
= −ψ0B(V B)
V B
ψB(V B)
. (19)
From the uniqueness of the bargaining solution, it follows that (19) has a unique solution
(UB, V B), where V B ∈ (0, v+Xl− I). As for claim 1), implicitly differentiating (19) with
respect to θ gives
dV B
dθ
= β
[r + qF ] q
0
E − [r + qE] q0F
[r + qE]
2
ψ2B
ψB
£
ψ0B + V Bψ
00
B
¤− V B ¡ψ0B¢2 < 0,
implying that dUB/dθ > 0. This, in conjunction with the monotonicity of qE and qF ,
implies that V R is decreasing and UR increasing in θ.
Claims 2)-3) follow now from the construction of the bargaining frontier and the
monotonicity of UB and V B. In particular, by (19), the threshold θ is uniquely determined
by V B = vˆ +Xl − I , while θ is uniquely determined by V B = bv − I. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. In equilibrium, θ, UB, and V B are determined by (19)
and the zero-profit constraint V R = k. The total derivatives from these two equations
generate the following equation system: −β [r+qF ]q0E−[r+qE ]q0F[r+qE ]2 ψB[ψ0BV Bψ00B]−V B(ψ0B)2ψ2B
V B
rq0F
[qF+r]
2
qF
qF+r
Ã dθ
dV B
!
=
Ã
0
1
!
dk. (20)
The determinant of this system,D, is negative. In conjunction with the limit properties
of qF and qE for θ → 0 and θ → ∞, this establishes the existence and uniqueness of a
solution to the equation system given by (19) and V R = k. We can now apply Cramer’s
rule and obtain
dθ
dk
= − 1
D
"
−V B rq
0
F
[qF + r]
2
ψB
£
ψ0B + V
Bψ00B
¤− V B (ψ0B)2
ψ2B
#
< 0.
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The rest follows from Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. An increase in γ shifts the bargaining frontier outward.
(The bargaining frontier is the same as in the basic model, except that I is replaced
by ∆I := (1 − γ)I.) Define ζ := ψ0B(V )/ψB(V ), and observe that dζ/d∆I < 0. (More
precisely, dζ/d∆I = [ψBψ00B − (ψ0B)2]/ψ2B < 0 if V ≤ vˆ − ∆I or V ≥ vˆ + Xl − ∆I , and
dζ/d∆I = ψ
0
B/ψ
2
B < 0 if vˆ − ∆I ≤ v ≤ vˆ + Xl − ∆I .) In what follows, we show that
dUB/d∆I < 0, which proves the claim in the proposition.
We argue to a contradiction, assuming that UB is nondecreasing in ∆I for some ∆I .
Inspection of the equilibrium conditions shows that this can only happen if θ is nonde-
creasing in ∆I . However, from the equation system generated by the total derivatives of
(19) and V R = k, we have that
dθ
d∆I
= − 1
D
V B
dζ
d∆I
qF
qF + r
< 0,
contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. Proposition 4 considers a decrease in I. It therefore remains
to prove the result for an increase in ∆X and/or Xl. Take any two profitability levels L
(low) and H (high). We argue to a contradiction, assuming that an increase in profitability
from L to H induces a clockwise move across regions. The proof proceeds in two steps.
We first show that this must imply that
V BH
UBH
<
V BL
UBL
. (21)
Recall that V RH = V
R
L = k. Suppose first that θH ≤ θL. From the zero-profit constraint
V RH = k, it follows that V
B
H ≤ V BL , implying UBH > UBL and therefore (21). Suppose next
that θH > θL. Moving clockwise across regions implies that
−ψ0B,H(V BH ) > −ψ0B,L(V BL ). (22)
Moreover, equations (9)-(11) imply that
−ψ0B,H(V BH )
V BH
ψB,H(V
B
H )
r + qE(θH)
r + qF (θH)
= −ψ0B,L(V BL )
V BL
ψB,L(V
B
L )
r + qE(θL)
r + qF (θL)
. (23)
Together, (22)-(23), θH > θL, and monotonicity of qE and qF , imply (21).
Having established that (21) must hold, we can now consider all possible moves across
regions. Suppose first we move from Region II or III to Region I. By the definition of
Regions I-III, this implies that
V BH
UBH
>
vˆH +Xl − I
uˆH
, (24)
29
and
V BL
UBL
≤ vˆL +Xl − I
uˆL
. (25)
Suppose first that ∆X increases while Xl remains constant, implying that uˆH > uˆL.
In conjunction with (24)-(25) and the assumption that vˆH/uˆH = vˆL/uˆL, this contradicts
(21). Suppose next that Xl increases while ∆X remains constant. As the equity frontier
remains unchanged, we have uˆH = uˆL. Again, by (24)-(25), this contradicts (21). Given
these arguments, the argument if both∆X and Xl increase is obvious. The argument for
why a move from Region III to Region II can be ruled out is analogous. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6. Define ω1 := (r + ξθ−
1
2 )/(r + ξθ
1
2 ) and ω2 := ξθ−
1
2/(r +
ξθ−
1
2 ). Note that dω2/dξ > 0, dω1/dξ < 0 if θ > 1, and dω1/dξ > 0 if θ < 1. From the
equation system generated by the total derivatives of (19) and V R = k, we have that
dV B
dξ
=
1
D
·
ω02V
Bβ
[r + qF ] q
0
E − [r + qE ] q0F
[r + qE ]
2 + ω
0
1βV
B rq
0
F
[qF + r]
2
¸
,
which is strictly negative if θ > 1. It remains to prove that θ becomes arbitrarily large if
k is sufficiently small. Suppose not. There then exists a sequence of equilibria indexed by
n such that θn → θ as kn → 0, where θ is finite. By (19), this implies that V Bn converges
to some strictly positive value V
B
. Since θn → θ, and since r remains constant, this
contradicts the zero-profit constraint for large n. Q.E.D.
9.3 Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 8
We first state the conditions for a market equilibrium with different investor types f ∈
F := {A,P}. The distribution of investors in the market is µf := Mf/
P
f∈F Mf , while
the degree of competition is θ :=
P
f∈F Mf/ME . Investor utilities are denoted by V
R
f and
V Bf , respectively, while the utility of an entrepreneur bargaining with a type−f investor
is denoted by UBf . Equilibrium utilities derive from the equations
V Rf =
qF (θ)
r + qF (θ)
V Bf for all f ∈ F, (26)
and
UR =
qE(θ)
r + qE(θ)
X
f∈F
µfU
B
f . (27)
Stationarity requires that
qf (θ)Mf = mf for any f ∈ F with µf > 0, (28)
30
and
qE(θ)ME = mE . (29)
We can now state the equilibrium conditions as follows:
Definition: Market Equilibrium with Two Types of Investors. A market equi-
librium in the market with contracting, bargaining, and search with two types of investors
is defined by the following conditions, which must hold for all f ∈ F.
i) Bargaining utilities (V Bf , U
B
f ) maximize the Nash product (8).
ii) Reservation values (V Rf , U
R) and V Rf satisfy the asset value equations (26)-(27).
iii) Flows (mE,mf ) and stocks (ME, Mf ) satisfy the stationarity conditions (28)-(29).
iv) Entry must be optimal for each type of investor :
- Type f = A (in short supply): mA = m if V RA > k, mA ∈ [0,m] if V RA = k, and mA = 0
if V RA < k.
- Type f = P (not in short supply): V RP = k if mP > 0 and V
R
P ≤ k if mP = 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. Stationarity in conjunction with V RA > V
R
P implies that
mA = m and mE = 1 − m. We now show that each θ is associated with a unique set
of bargaining utilities V Bf , which are continuous and decreasing in θ. One implication of
this is that the reservation values V Rf are also decreasing in θ. In conjunction with the
constraint V RP = k, this implies that the equilibrium is unique and that the bargaining
utilities of both investor types are increasing in k, as claimed in the proposition. Following
a decrease in k, we therefore move counterclockwise along each of the two bargaining
frontiers. The rest follows from the construction of ψB,A and ψB,P .
To simplify the notation, define ρ1(θ) := r/[r+ qF (θ)] and ρ2(θ) := qE(θ)/[r + qF (θ)],
where ρ01(θ) > 0 and ρ02(θ) < 0. From (26), we have that V Bf −V Rf = ρ1(θ)V Bf . Substituting
this and (27) into (9) (with appropriately added subscripts f ∈ F ) and computing total
derivatives, we obtain the following equation system: βψ0B,A [1− ρ2µA] + ρ1 hψ0B,A + V BA ψ00B,Ai −βψ0B,Pρ2µP
−βψ0B,Aρ2µA βψ0B,P [1− ρ2µP ] + ρ1
h
ψ0B,P + V
B
P ψ
00
B,P
i 
·
Ã
dV BA
dV BP
!
=
Ã
βψ0B,Aρ
0
2µA − ρ01V BA ψ0B,A
βψ0B,Pρ
0
2µP − ρ01V BP ψ0B,P
!
dθ.
The determinant of this system, eD, is
eD = £βψ0B,A + ρ1 ¡ψ0B,A + V BA ψ00B,A¢¤ £βψ0B,P + ρ1 ¡ψ0B,P + V BP ψ00B,P ¢¤
−βψ0B,Aρ2µA
£
βψ0B,P + ρ1
¡
ψ0B,P + V
B
P ψ
00
B,P
¢¤
−βψ0B,Pρ2µP
£
βψ0B,A + ρ1
¡
ψ0B,A + V
B
A ψ
00
B,A
¢¤
.
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Since µA = 1− µP , eD is a linear function of µA and thus minimized at either µA = 0
or µA = 1. If the minimum is attained at µA = 1, eD is bounded from below by£
βψB
0
A(1− ρ2) + ρ1
¡
ψB
0
A + V
B
A ψB
00
A
¢¤ £
βψB
0
P + ρ1
¡
ψB
0
P + V
B
P ψB
00
P
¢¤
,
which is positive since ρ2 < 1. Similarly, if the minimum is attained at µA = 0, eD is also
positive. Applying Cramer’s rule, we have that dV BA /dθ = DA/ eD, where
DA : =
£
βψ0B,Aρ
0
2µA − ρ01V BA ψ0B,A
¤ £
βψ0B,P (1− ρ2µP ) + ρ
¡
1ψ
0
B,P + V
B
P ψ
00
B,P
¢¤
− £βψ0B,Pρ02µP − ρ01V BP ψ0B,P ¤ £−βψ0B,Pρ2µP ¤ .
Given that ρ01 > 0 and ρ02 < 0, we have that DA < 0 and thus dV BA /dθ < 0. Analogous
calculations show that dV BP /dθ < 0. By (26), this implies that dV
R
f /dθ < 0. Q.E.D.
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